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The present paper applies the geometric linear parameter-varying (LPV) fault detec-
tion methods to a high-fidelity commercial aircraft problem. The successive steps of the
design, including fault modeling, LPV model generation, and LPV FDI filter synthesis are
discussed. Geometric fault detection and isolation filters are known for having excellent
fault isolation, fault reconstruction and sensitivity properties under small modeling uncer-
tainty and noise. However they are assumed to be sensitive to model uncertainty and noise,
hence an investigation is made to assess the robustness properties of the proposed design
framework. The novelty of the present paper is in the application of robust post-filtering
of the raw LPV fault detection residual, by applying an H∞ output injection gain to the
nominal fault detection filter. To asses the performance of the geometric filter, an aircraft
dynamics example is presented, where aileron actuator faults are detected and isolated
from additional elevator and rudder fault cases.
I. Introduction
Modern fly-by-wire aircraft flight control systems are becoming more complex with many actuators
controlling several aerodynamic surfaces. While performance goals, including aerodynamic drag minimization
and structural load suppression are becoming more and more important, flight must be kept at the same
highest safety level. In parallel, there is a clear trend towards the All-Electric Aircraft. Recently, Airbus
introduced on the A380 a new hydraulics layout [20], where the three Hydraulics circuitry is replaced by a
two Hydraulics plus two Electric layout, which saves one ton mass for the aircraft. Each primary surface
has a single hydraulically powered actuator and electrically powered back-up with the exception of the outer
aileron, which uses the two hydraulic systems together. Consequently, the trends of complexity and more-
electric architectures, like Electromechanical Actuators (EMA) with more fault sources, raise the importance
of availability, reliability and operating safety. For safety critical systems, like aircraft, the consequence of
faults in the control system hardware and software can be extremely serious in terms of human mortality and
economical impact. This is the reason why all aircraft manufacturers are compliant with stringent safety
regulations of FAA, EASA and other aviation authorities. However, there is a growing need for on-line
supervision and fault diagnosis to satisfy the newer societal imperatives towards an environmentally-friendlier
aircraft with still the highest level of safety and reliability. The traditional approach to fault diagnosis in the
wider application context is based on hardware redundancy methods which use multiple sensors, actuators
computers and software to measure and control a particular variable [10]. Based on the mathematical model
of the plant, analytical relation between different sensor outputs can be used to generate residual signals.
There is a growing interest in methods which do not require additional hardware redundancy, and only rely
on the ever increasing level of computational power onboard the aircraft.
In analytical redundancy schemes, the resulting difference generated from the consistency checking of
different variables is called as a residual signal. The residual should be zero when the system is normal,
and should diverge from zero when a fault occurs in the system. This zero and non-zero property of the
∗senior research fellow, Systems and Control Laboratory
†corresponding author:vanek@sztaki.hu
‡research advisor, Systems and Control Laboratory
§research director, Head of Systems and Control Laboratory
1 of 13
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference
08 - 11 August 2011, Portland, Oregon
AIAA 2011-6681
Copyright © 2011 by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. All rights reserved.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
al
in
t V
an
ek
 o
n 
Se
pt
em
be
r 2
4,
 2
01
9 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/6.
201
1-6
681
 
residual is used to determine whether or not faults have occurred. Analytical redundancy makes use of a
mathematical model and the goal is the determination of faults of a system from the comparison of available
system measurements with a priori information represented by the mathematical model, through generation
of residual quantities and their analysis. Various approaches have been applied to the residual generation
problem, the parity space approach [6], the multiple model method [4], detection filter design using geometric
approach [14], frequency domain concepts [9], unknown input observer concept [5], dynamic inversion based
detection [8], and using rational nullspace bases [22]. Most of these design approaches refer to linear time-
invariant (LTI) systems. The geometric concept is further generalized to linear parameter-varying (LPV)
systems by [1], while input affine nonlinear systems are considered by [7]. The basic concepts underlying
observer-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) schemes are the generation of residuals and the use of an
optimal or adaptive threshold function to differentiate faults from disturbances, see the surveys of [9, 16].
Generally, the residuals, also known as diagnostic signals, are generated by the FDI filter from the available
input and output measurements of the monitored system. The threshold function is used to robustify the
detection of the fault by minimizing the effects from false faults, disturbances and commands on the residuals.
For fault isolation, the generated residual has to include enough information to differentiate said fault from
another, usually this is accomplished through structured residuals or directional vectors. Robustness of the
FDI algorithm is determined by its capability to decouple the filter performance outputs from disturbances,
errors, and unmodelled dynamics.
The geometric design approach, for example, is known for its excellent fault isolation, fault reconstruction
and sensitivity properties under small modeling uncertainty and noise. This paper shows the application
of the geometric LPV FDI approach to a complex, 6-degrees-of-freedom (DOF) rigid body aircraft model.
Previous approaches [19, 13] only considered the longitudinal dynamics of the airplane, which is applicable
for elevator fault detection case but as described in [21] designs based on decoupled dynamics are inherently
limited to detection around the trim (cruise) flight condition and might be less robust to deviation from the
trim operating point. One possible extension of the geometric LPV FDI approach is to take advantage of the
possible multi dimensional residual signal. The output of the geometric FDI filter spans the entire subspace
where the fundamental problem of residual generation (FPRG) has a solution. Only ad-hoc methods have
been described in the literature to form a proper residual signal based on a subset of the geometric FDI filter
outputs. In the present paper the entire subspace spanned by multiple outputs are used to form a residual
signal, which provides improved fault reconstruction an fault detection response performance, together with
improved robustness, which is explicitly handled by the post-filter synthesis.
Derivation of the LPV mathematical model, representing the aircraft dynamics and the effects of various
actuator faults is discussed first. A geometric filter is designed on the nominal LPV plant, which only
represents the rigid body states. The robustness of the geometric filter over the set of uncertain plants is
analyzed to assess the applicability of the approach to the full nonlinear problem. The proposed filter is
than analyzed on an augmented LPV model of the aircraft, which includes actuator and sensor dynamics.
Finally, an aircraft aileron FDI example is detailed in the article with high-fidelity simulation results.
The importance of this paper is on the application (simulation) of the geometric approach based LPV
FDI technique to a nonlinear, high-fidelity 6-DOF aircraft simulator, where issues of model uncertainty,
realistic disturbances and robustness have to be accounted for in the design stage. The remainder of the
paper is structured as follows. Section II and III presents the notation and basic concepts of geometric fault
detection filter design. The application example of a civil aircraft is described in Section IV. The method is
applied to the high fidelity aircraft example, which demonstrates the proposed approach, given in Section V.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. Notation
R and C denote the set of real and complex numbers, respectively. RH∞ denotes the set of proper,
rational functions with real coefficients that are analytic in the closed right half of the complex plane.
Rm×n, Cm×n, and RHm×n∞ denote the sets of m × n matrices whose elements are in R, C, and RH∞,
respectively. A single superscript index is used to denote vectors, e.g. Rl denotes the set of l × 1 vectors
whose elements are in R. For a matrix M ∈ Cm×n, M∗ denotes the complex conjugate transpose. σ¯(M)
and σ(M) denote the maximum and minimum singular values. ‖M‖ denotes the matrix norm induced by
the vector 2-norm. It is known that ‖M‖ = σ¯(M). For a vector v ∈ Cn, Re[v] denotes the real part of
v. For G ∈ RHm×n∞ , ‖G‖∞ := supω σ¯(G(jω)). Finally, let G ∈ RH(n+k)×(n+m)∞ and ∆ ∈ RHn×n∞ be given
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and partition G :=
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
]
with G11 ∈ RHn×n∞ and G22 ∈ RHk×m∞ . If I − G11∆ is invertible at ω = ∞,
then define Fu(G,∆) as the linear fractional transformation (LFT) obtained by closing ∆ around the upper
channels of G:
Fu(G,∆) := G22 +G21∆ (I −G11∆)−1G12 (1)
III. Geometric FDI Filters for qLPV systems
This section briefly describes the formulation of fault detection filters designed using geometric concepts.
The derivation of the geometric FDI filters is presented for qLPV systems with no disturbance, no uncertainty
and the detection and isolation of two faults. Consider the qLPV system with two additive actuator faults:
x˙ = A(ρ)x+B(ρ)u+ L1(ρ)f1 + L2(ρ)f2 (2)
y = Cx
where L1 and L2 represent the faults directions in the state space. f1 and f2 are the fault signals. The time
varying scheduling parameter ρ is assumed to be available at operational time.
The fault signals are zero if there is no fault but nonzero if the particular fault occurs. Only actuator
faults are considered here but sensor faults can also be considered within the theory. The fundamental
problem of residual generation is to synthesize residual generators (filters) with outputs ri (i = 1, 2) that
have the following decoupling property: ri is sensitive to fi but insensitive to fj , i 6= j. More precisely, if
fi = 0 then limt→∞ ri(t) = 0 and if fi 6= 0 then ri 6= 0.
The solution of this problem depends on the parameter varying (C,A)-invariant subspaces and certain
parameter varying unobservability subspaces [1]. A parameter varying (C,A)-unobservability subspace S is
a subspace such that there exist matrices G(ρ) and H with the property that S is the maximal parameter
varying (A + GC) invariant subspace contained in Ker HC. The family of parameter varying (C,A)-
unobservability subspaces containing a given set L has a minimal element. Define Li = Im Li (i = 1, 2) and
denote by S∗ the smallest parameter varying unobservability subspace containing L2. Then the fundamental
problem of residual generation has a solution if and only if S∗ ∩ L1 = 0 [15, 2]. The condition S∗ ∩ L1 = 0
ensures that the fault to be detected is not hidden in the parameter varying unobservability subspace of the
detection filter. In fact, the fault direction will be decoupled from the rest of the fault directions since they
are contained in the parameter varying unobservability subspace of the residual generator.
The residual generator associated with fault direction L1 can be described by an observer of the form:
w˙ = N(ρ)w −G(ρ)y + F (ρ)u (3)
r1 = Mw −Hy
where u and y are the known input and measured output signals of the original qLPV system. w is the state
of the residual generator and r1 is the residual.
Denote by P the projection operator P : X → X/S∗. The state matrices can be determined as follows
[3]. H is a solution of the equation Ker HC = Ker C + S∗, and M is the unique solution of MP = HC.
Consider a gain matrix Gˆ chosen such that (A + GˆC)S∗ ⊆ S∗ and define Aˆ = P (A + GC)PT . Aˆ does not
necessarily define a stable system. To obtain quadratically stable filters one can set N = Aˆ + G˜M, where
G˜ := X−1K and X, K are determined from the linear matrix inequality (LMI):
0  AˆT (ρ)X +XAˆ(ρ) +MTKT (ρ) +K(ρ)M (4)
0  X = XT , (5)
for every parameter ρ in the parameter space. Then set G = PGˆ+ G˜H and F = PB.
If the parameter dependence of the time varying scheduling variables is affine, then the relevant parameter
varying invariant subspaces can be computed and the set of LMIs can be solved. Using this approach there
are as many filters as faults to detect, and their state dimensions are equal to the dimension of X/S∗. The
filter gains can be tuned in order to impose robustness properties to the detection filter.
A. Robust FDI filter for Model Matching
Since the geometric LPV FDI design does not consider model uncertainty, the detection performance has to
be robustified by additional methods. It is shown in [17] that filter synthesis for uncertain plants using the
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model matching framework has a self-optimality property, leading to fault detection performance which is
robust. The framework of [17] is extended here to address the special properties of geometric FDI filters with
multi-dimensional residual subspaces. The filter dynamics described in Eq. 3 can be shaped by appropriate
output injection, using N(ρ) = A0(ρ) +D1(ρ)M the poles of the filter can be assigned arbitrarily. Since the
output r1 of the FPRG filter spans the whole subspace which satisfies the FPRG problem, an FDI post-filter
acting on these signals does not change the fault decoupling and isolating properties of the original scheme,
it just shapes the fault detection response. The post-filter employed here assigns the dynamics of N(ρ) in a
way, fault reconstruction is satisfied on the uncertain plant using the model matching framework, with ideal
behavior Tid, as shown in Figure 1.
FDIA/C FPRGy
u
T
d
r
f
f
o
r
i
1 2 e
id
Figure 1. Framework for robust model matching FDI filter synthesis .
IV. Aircraft Model
A. General Aircraft Characteristics
The aircraft model used in the project is an aircraft from Airbus. The aircraft has two engines and its
nominal configuration, along with the operation range considered in the project, is listed in Table 1. The
Table 1. System parameters of the A/C model
Parameter Description Value and Units Uncertain bounds
m Weight, 200 tonns [180;220]
h Altitude, 37000 ft [15000;40000]
CG position of c.g. 0.3 [0.27;0.33]
rel. to mean aero. chord,
Vcas Calibrated airspeed, 267 kts [160;320]
aircraft has 18 control inputs (since airbrake is not effective in cruise flight, it is removed from the list of
inputs), and measurement of 6-DOF motion with load factor (nx, ny, nz), body rate (p, q, r), velocity (VT ),
aerodynamic angles (α, β), position (X,Y, Z) and attitude (φ, θ, ψ) outputs. The inputs are listed in Table 2:
Notice that Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer is used for longitudinal trimming purposes, elevator deflections
are zero. Since cruise flight condition is symmetric, none of the ailerons, spoilers or the rudder are deflected
to provide trim.
The rigid body aircraft equations of motion are augmented with nonlinear actuator [11] and sensor char-
acteristics. The nonlinear body-axes rigid body dynamics includes 13 states using quaternion formalism:
p, q, r body rates, u, v, w velocities all in body axes, q0, q1, q2, q3 quaternions, representing the rotation be-
tween the body and inertial axes, and X,Y, Z positions in the North-East-Down coordinate frame, assuming
Flat Earth for simplicity.
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Table 2. System inputs of the A/C model
Input Description Trim Value and Units
pi1 Left Engine Throttle, 1.2235 deg
pi2 Right Engine Throttle, 1.2235 deg
δa,IL Aileron internal Left, 0 deg
δa,IR Aileron internal Right, 0 deg
δa,EL Aileron external Left, 0 deg
δa,ER Aileron external Right, 0 deg
δsp,1L Spoiler 1 Left, 0 deg
δsp,1R Spoiler 1 Right, 0 deg
δsp,23L Spoiler 2, 3 Left, 0 deg
δsp,23R Spoiler 2, 3 Right, 0 deg
δsp,45L Spoiler 4, 5 Left, 0 deg
δsp,45R Spoiler 4, 5 Right, 0 deg
δsp,6L Spoiler 6 Left, 0 deg
δsp,6R Spoiler 6 Right, 0 deg
δe,L Elevator Left, 0 deg
δe,R Elevator Right, 0 deg
δr Rudder, 0 deg
δih Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer, −2.3939 deg
B. Deriving a reliable LPV model
The ADDSAFE benchmark model of the aircraft is given in a nonlinear simulation, where several components
are given as black-box models. Aerodynamic coefficients are represented by trained neural-networks, for
which it is not possible to derive affine LPV models in the form of Equation 2 analyticaly.
On the basis of the required operating envelope it is decided to have weight, center of gravity position,
altitude above sea level, and calibrated airspeed as scheduling variables. The nonlinear model is then trimmed
and linearized at different points of the operating envelope to obtain pointwise LTI models. These LTI models
are then approximated by an affine LPV model using the DLR propriatary LFR toolbox. The procedure is
described in detail in [12].
When obtaining the LPV representation, several simplifying assumptions are made to reduce the problem
size. The airbrake, which is disabled at high Mach numbers, is removed from the control inputs since it
has no effect on the aircraft. Since the original aircraft model uses quaternions, which impose additional
constraints on the state equations, the model used for trim, linearization and LPV model generation is
rewritten using conventional Euler angles [18]. The LPV model is open-loop, without the control loop and,
since the actuators and sensors are assumed to have unit steady state gain and low-pass characteristics,
their dynamics are omitted. Trim is obtained with zero aileron, rudder and elevator deflection, left and
right engines are providing the same amount of thrust to balance the yawing motion. Pitch axis trim is
obtained with the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer, while the aircraft has constant (parameter depending)
Angle-of-attack. Since the resulting 12 state linear model is unstable additional simplifications have to be
done. The open loop aircraft model is slightly unstable around the yaw angle (ψ), and has two modes (X,Y )
which are integrators. Since the FDI problem is invariant of X,Y positions and yaw angle these states are
removed from the dynamics, truncating these states does not change the dynamics of the remaining states.
The resulting model with nine states, as described in [21], almost perfectly matches the original 12 states
model, and stable in the behavior of the remaining states, and outputs in a limited flight envelope. The flight
envelope in the current investigation spans the following space: h = [23000; 29000]ft, Vcas = [170; 230]kts,
while cg. position is fixed to xcg = 0.3 and weight is also assumed constant with m = 200000kg. The LPV
model has two scheduling parameters ρ = (h, Vcas), this simplification is necessary to obtain computationaly
tractable problems. The final rigid body LPV model, assuming full state measurement, is obtained in a form
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of:
x˙ = (A0 +Ahh+AV V )x+ (B0 +Bhh+BV V )u+ (F10 + F1hh+ F1V V )f1 + (F20 + F2hh+ F2V V )f2
(6)
y = x
The engine, sensor and actuator models are not studied in the current investigation, only the rigid body
dynamics are approximated by the LPV model. When the nonlinear aircraft characteristics have to be
compared to the behavior of the corresponding LPV A/C model the schematics used in Figure 2 should be
used.
LPV
A/C
LTI
sensor
LTI
actuator
Actuator
trim
State
trim
- +
Figure 2. Interconnection of the LPV rigid body equations with sensor and actuator model.
The resulting LPV model can be augmented with first order sensor and actuator dynamics derived from
the high-fidelity simulation, to account for their effect on the aircraft behavior. Since the filters obtained
by geometrical FDI methods require intense computation onboard the aircraft, only the pure rigid body
dynamics model will be investigated for filter synthesis first.
C. Actuator Fault Model
The fault scenario under investigation is left inboard aileron fault. To account for the various types of faults
the original affine LPV system description of have to be augmented with additional fault directions as in
Equation 2.
x˙(t) = A(ρ(t))x(t) +B(ρ(t))u(t) + L1(ρ(t))fa,i,L(t) + L2(ρ(t))fe,L(t) + L3(ρ(t))fr(t) (7)
y˜(t) = C˜x(t) (8)
Where L1(ρ(t)) = B(3, :)(ρ(t)) is the corresponding column of the control effectiveness matrix of the
left inboard aileron. L2(ρ(t)) = B(14, :)(ρ(t)) corresponds to the left elevator control effectiveness, while
L3(ρ(t)) = B(16, :)(ρ(t)) is the column of the rudder control effectiveness, in addition to fault directions,
the effect of the unknown wind disturbance is also included in the system model by additional columns in
the B(ρ(t)) matrix. One can attempt to design an FDI filter which is insensitive not only for elevator and
rudder faults, but also insensitive for the wx, wy, wz components of winndgust. It is important to note,
that although we are interested in detecting left internal aileron faults we included the effect of additional
actuator faults. It is necessary, since in the design stage we want to design an FDI filter which is sensitive for
faults in the direction of L1, but to provide good isolation and to keep false alarm rate low the filter should
be insensitive for additional faults characterized by the directions of L2 and L3. On the other hand, adding
additional actuators to the augmented plant does not provide additional benefits, since the right aileron has
exactly the same B matrix with an opposite sign, hence these two faults lie in the same subspace. The
outer ailerons are creating similar effect on the aircraft and are virtually indistinguishable from the inner
ailerons if the system becomes uncertain. The left and the right elevator have also the same column in their
control effectiveness matrix. While engines have significantly slower dynamics and their diagnostics is well
established. While fault of a single spoiler creates significantly smaller response than the primary control
surfaces, hence in the initial investigation they are omitted.
It is also interesting to note, that only a subset of sensor measurement outputs y˜ are selected by C˜ for
the fault detection problem. Namely, the measurement of acceleration is omitted, since actuator inputs have
6 of 13
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
al
in
t V
an
ek
 o
n 
Se
pt
em
be
r 2
4,
 2
01
9 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/6.
201
1-6
681
 
direct feedthrough and hence their D matrix is nonzero, which is difficult to handle in the geometric FDI
framework.
The various fault scenarios to be investigated are disconnection, stuck and bias on the aileron actuator.
In case of disconnection, the aileron surface goes to the position dictated by the aerodynamic forces acting
on it, which is at −12 deg, the physical limit on the deflection. The failure signal is defined as fa,i,L(t) =
−12deg − ua,i,L(t). The other scenario is liquid jamming, when a bias bl,j occurs on the rod sensor, and
hence on the rod position relative to the commanded deflection. This can be captured by a fault signal of
fa,i,L(t) = bl,j . The third case is called solid jamming, when the actuator is stuck at a given position bs,j and
does not move, this is similar to the first scenario, only the offset is not 12 degrees but some other quantity
bs,j .
V. FDI Filter Design for the Aircraft
A geometric LTI FDI filter is designed first for the aileron fault detection problem of the aircraft. In
the linear case it is possible to design a filter which decouples aileron faults from elevator, rudder faults and
windgust disturbances. First, the filter design steps are detailed and the achieved performance is analysed.
Detailed simulations on the high-fidelity aircraft model with injected faults follows.
A. Filter Design Steps
The main idea behind the filter design formulation is that aileron faults appear on the filter residual output,
while elevator and rudder faults are embedded in the unobservability subspace of the filter. For that reason
the the nominal design point of the LPV model derived in Section IV, with additional windgust disturbance
inputs, is augmented with left inner aileron, left elevator, and rudder faults, by using the successive input
directions from the B(ρ) and D(ρ) matrices as fault directions in the linear model. Load factor, nx, ny,
and nz, measurement is omitted from the model, since the D(ρ) matrix associated with these acceleration
outputs is nonzero, which makes the geometric FDI synthesis more complicated. The resulting LTI FPRG
filter, using the methods developed in [2], has 6 residual output, 27 inputs, and 6 states. Since perfect
decoupling is possible, the transfer functions between elevator to residual and rudder to residual are zero,
while the 6 residual signals have different tracking responses for aileron faults.
To enhance the performance of the obtained filter, the LTI aircraft model is augmented with first order
sensor and actuator models, on all input and output channels. Since the corresponding mathematical models
are Airbus propriety, they are not discusses here. Using the schematics of Figure 1 the model matching
problem is set up, with Tid =
s2
s2+2s+1 , where the problem is to find the H∞ optimal filter FDI which
has 6 inputs from the nominal geometric filter FPRG and provides 7 outputs, 6 of which are fed back to
the FPRG filter using output injection, while the 7th output of the filter is used to form a residual. The
residual is penalized to match the ideal behavior of Tid in the design framework. Note, that it is desirable
to have actuator and sensor dynamics included in the FPRG filter design, which is not the case here since
computational complexity of those filters are significantly higher.
Based on the design experience gained in the linear FPRG synthesis, the LPV fault detection filter design
is solved next. Since decoupling aileron faults, from all additional disturbances, including elevator, rudder
faults and windgust, is not feasible, a subset including only elevator faults is used in the LPV FPRG design.
The resulting LPV FPRG filter has 4 states and 4 outputs, with zero gain from elevator faults and different
responses from aileron faults on all 4 outputs. The performance of the LPV FPRG filter is also enhanced by
a post-filter. For simplicity reasons the FDI post-filter design is based on the nominal LTI plant of the LPV
model. Similarly to the previous case, the aircraft model is augmented with actuator and sensor dynamics,
and the 4 outputs of the FPRG filter are used as measurements in the FDI post-filter, where 4 out of the 5
outputs are used for output injection to change the dynamics of the FPRG filter, while the fifth is used to
form a residual. The residual is penalized to match the ideal behavior of Tid in the design framework.
B. Simulation Results
The filters are applied to the nonlinear aircraft model after taking the trim values into consideration, on
both control input and sensor output signals. Since the simulation is implemented under Simulink with
0.01sec fixed step size, the corresponding filters are also discretized with the same sampling time using
bilinear transformation. It is also worth mentioning, that the simulation is in closed-loop with the flight
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control system set to altitude and heading hold mode and moderate atmospheric windgust disturbances are
perturbing the aircraft flight. It is important to note the implementation of the LPV FDI filter, where the
trim conditions on both input and output side have to be scheduled with the flight condition.
To be able to establish the thresholds on fault detection, to have low false alarm rate, while as few
as possible missed detections the filter performance is analyzed in fault free situations first. It is seen in
initial investigations, that a transient response occurs at the simulation start, which is due to the unexpected
behavior of the control system, hence simulation plots only show responses from 10s after the initial transient
settles. Since the residual signal is very close to zero in fault free situations, the additional disturbance of
elevator faults is used to set the minimum detection threshold. The excellent decoupling performance of the
filters for elevator runaway faults is investigated, as shown in Figure 3. The left elevator starts to drift from
its commanded position with 5 deg/s rate starting at 20 s. The simulation starts from the nominal flight
condition of 200knots and 26000ft, while cg position is set to xcg = 0.3 and weight is 200000kg.
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Figure 3. Left elevator runaway scenario, fault occurs at 20s.
As seen on Figure 3 the fault creates significant pitch rate response and the angle of attack also changes
dramatically during the maneuver, which leads to covering large part of the flight envelope. The right
elevator with lower response time and later the THS compensates against the failure effect.
An increase in the residual signal can be seen in Figure 4. The LTI FDI residual reaches 0.175 deg
expected aileron fault offset which is due to deviation from the trim flight condition, where the linear model
used in the FDI filter design is no more accurate. The LPV FDI residual reaches a significantly lower value
of 0.105 deg, which is due to the better mathematical model used in the LPV filter synthesis. Based on these
results, where the elevator runaway can be regarded as a worst case disturbance, the detection thresholds
are selected as 0.105 × 1.5 deg and 0.175 × 1.5 deg respectively for the LTI and LPV case. It is expected
that in most situations, where aileron fault is not present, the residual signal stays away from the detection
threshold, and as soon as the aircraft motion is stabilized the residual goes back to near zero value, avoiding
triggering false alarms in the detection system.
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Figure 4. Left elevator runaway, LTI (left) and LPV (right) FDI filter residual.
After selection of the detection threshold the fault detection performance can be analyzed. The first
aileron fault scenario is left inboard aileron disconnection as seen on Figure 5, this occurs when the connection
between the actuator rod and the control surface is lost due to mechanical separation of the two components.
Due to the aerodynamic forces, the freely floating aileron goes to −12 deg where it is reaching its physical
limit, while the commanded position still remains positive as seen on Figure 5. The simulation starts from
the nominal flight condition of 200knots and 26000ft, while cg position is set to xcg = 0.3 and weight is
200000kg. The large unintended deflection leads to significant deviation from trim condition and the flight
controller tries to compensate against it mainly in the lateral channel with rudder and right aileron, while
the elevator commands are not influenced (see Fig.5). Significant sideslip can be seen also, which is due to
asymmetric aircraft configuration, while roll rate has almost 3 deg/s peak after the fault occurs. Since this
fault creates large roll rate and sideslip motion, which also leads to significant structural stress in the wings
the detection of this fault is critical. Figure 6 shows a detection time of 0.51s in the LTI and 0.42s in the
LPV case. The difference between the two detection times is mainly due to the difference in thresholds. It
can be inferred from this result, that the performance of the LTI FDI approach is almost as good as the
LPV, while it is significantly easier to implement the linear detection filter.
The most demanding fault scenario is left inboard aileron liquid jamming as seen on Figure 7, this means
that a bias occurs on the rod sensor and the actuator shifts from it nominal 1.5deg deflection to −0.75deg
deflection and it remains −2.25deg apart from it commanded position. To asses the performance difference,
and the applicability of the LPV approach to a larger flight envelope, the simulation starts off from the
nominal flight condition, from 170knots and 23000ft, while cg position is set to xcg = 0.3 and weight is
200000kg. The operating envelope is explored in this maneuver since it is one of the corner points of the
LPV model.
Figure 7 also shows the abrupt change in roll rate at 20sec when the fault occurs, otherwise slight
deflection can be seen on the rudder but elevator and THS is unaffected, mainly the right aileron compensates
the effect of the failure, which is much smaller and hence harder to detect than the disconnection. Using the
above mentioned threshold a detection time of 0.87s is achieved with the LTI approach and 0.61s with the
LPV method. What is worth to notice is the large difference between the steady state values of residuals.
While both the LTI and the LPV filter are able to reconstruct the fault magnitude in the disconnection
case, around the nominal flight condition, the reconstruction performance of the LTI filter in the off-nominal
situation with small faults is compromised, as shown on Figure 8. On the other hand, the performance of
the LPV FDI filter is excellent, only the initial transient has to be settled.
VI. Conclusions
This paper considers the design of geometric fault detection filters and their application to a high fidelity
aircraft model, and shows the advantages of advanced model-based LPV methods which are, compared with
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Figure 5. Left aileron disconnection scenario, fault occurs at 25s.
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Figure 6. Left aileron disconnection, geometric FDI filter residual.
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Figure 7. Left aileron liquid jamming scenario, fault occurs at 25s.
10 20 30 40 50
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
time (s)
LT
I F
D
I r
es
id
ua
l
 
 
res.
fault
10 20 30 40 50
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
time (s)
LP
V 
FD
I r
es
id
ua
l
 
 
res.
fault
Figure 8. Aileron liquid jamming, LTI (left) and LPV (right) FDI filter residual.
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the traditional LTI methods, applicable to a larger flight domain and hence in the future might be tested
on industrial platforms. First, a geometric filter is designed on the nominal plant. Next the robustness
of the proposed filter is enhanced on an uncertain aircraft model, using the robust model matching H∞
problem formulation with appropriately chosen output injection. The proposed LPV filter is then applied
to a high-fidelity aircraft model, where different aileron faults are successfully detected and when designed
properly isolated from elevator faults in reasonable time. Further research should extend the validity of the
present approach and based on the present findings provide a fault detection approach suitable for industrial
test purposes.
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